Showing 1 - 10 of 114
This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts.  It motivates the discussion by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671389
This paper uses a vertical relational contract between two firms to explore the implications of trade credit when the ability to repay is not observed by the supplier.  Trade credit limits the supplier's possibilities to punish the cashless downstream firms and termination may be used in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004375
We develop a framework in which: (i) a firm can have a new product tested publicly before launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise fixed.  Price flexibility boosts the strong positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the strong negative impact...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275435
In this paper we address the question as to why fund managers may trade on short-term information in a financial market that offers more profitable trading on long-term information. We consider a setting in which a fund manager`s ability is unknown and an investor uses performance observations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661382
In an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime that suffers a random adverse shock, we study the strategies of imperfectly and sequentially informed speculators that may trigger an endogenous devaluation before it occurs exogenously. The game played by the speculators has a unique symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661412
Herding arises when an agents private information is swamped by public information in what Jackson and Kalai (1997) call a recurring game. The agent will fail to reveal his own information and will follow the actions of his predecessor and, as a result, useful information is lost, which might...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604901
This paper examines experimental evidence relating to herd behaviour in situations when subjects can learn from each other, and can delay their decision. Subjects acted rationally, gaining from observational learning, despite penalties for delay. Cascades were ubiquitous and reverse-cascades...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605219
This paper presents a pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry to analyse the impact of information costs on endogenous network building and matching by information intermedairies. The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on incentives for trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977860
The increasing number of antitrust cases that affect more than one country calls for more active cooperation between competition authorities.  I analyse the impact of exchange of confidential information between two authorities deciding on a multinational merger.  The authorities want to clear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489380
A two-sided, pair-wise matching model is developed to analyse the strategic interaction between two information intermediaries who compete in commission rates and network size, giving rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure. The model suggests that network competition between information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090624