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DOMINATED STRATEGIES AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE.

SAMUELSON, L. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777070

EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES.

MAILATH, G.J.; SAMUELSON, L.; SWINKELS, J. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631467

Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals.

Bond, E.W.; Gresik, T.A. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1998

In this paper, the authors use a model of tax competition to study the role of information sharing in common agency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631513

SAMUELSON, L.; ZHANG, J. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631517

Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs.

Bond, E.W.; Crocker, K.J. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777012

DOMINATED STRATEGIES AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE

SAMUELSON, L. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777028

THE EMPIRICAL STATUS OF JOB SEARCH THEORY.

DEVINE, T.J.; KIEFER, N.M. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777080

Limit Orders, Asymmetric Information and the Formation of asset Prices with a Computerized Specialist.

Baye, M.R.; Gillette, A.; De Vries, C.G. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777102

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN ENVIRONMENTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION.

CROCKER, K.J.; SNOW, A. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478680

Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream.

Ghatak, M.; Morelli, M.; Sjostrom, T. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 2000

This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631444