August 2001 <p> In this paper, we explore the consequences of using equilibrium models of auctions in making policy recommendations, such as the design of real world markets, or as a basis for structural estimation when bidders make small errors in optimization. We consider two types of error prone...</p>

Revised April 2002 <p> Economic theory suggests that if firms can successfully collude, they will be able to increase their own profits at the consumers’ expense. Government antitrust policy aims to protect the public from such behavior. Enforcing such policy depends on a prosecutor’s ability...</p>

Revised October 2002 <p> When should a buyer award a procurement contract through competitive bidding, and when would negotiating with the sellers be preferred? To shed some light on this question, we examine a unique data set of non-residential, private sector building contracts awarded in...</p>

April 2002 <p> This article surveys empirical findings from recent studies of Internet auctions and summarizes the economic insights gained from these findings. The main questions addressed in this article are: What are the rules of the game used in online auctions and how do these rules influence...</p>

Revised March 2001 <p> This paper estimates a discrete choice model of housing product demand to study the causes of black urbanization. Our estimation strategy incorporates that there are unobserved product attributes which are correlated with observed product attributes. We bound racial...</p>

May 2001 <p> In many studies in empirical industrial organization, the economist needs to decide between several non-nested models of industry equilibrium. In this paper, we develop a new approach to the model selection problem that can be used when the economist must decide between models with...</p>

September 1999 <p> Economists are generally suspicious of equilibria that are not robust to small perturbations since Agents in real world problems may not be able to perfectly optimize. This research studies two forms of perturbations in a benchmark auction model where firms submit sealed bids to...</p>

February 2003 <p> Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the rationality assumptions used in these models to be implausible. In this paper, we explore whether structural auction models can...</p>

February 2001 <p> In this research, we develop an approach to the problem of identification and testing for bid-rigging in procurement auctions that tightly integrates economic theory and econometric practice. First, we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders. We show how...</p>