We characterize the optimal regulatory policy to promote demand response in the electricity sector. Demand response arises when consumers reduce their purchases of electricity in times of peak demand, when the utility's marginal cost of supplying electricity is relatively high. The optimal...

We examine the incentives of access-regulated firms to invest in infrastructure facilities they must share with competitors. The non-strategic incentives imply that investment depends positively on the market size. The strategic incentives imply that investment also depends on market...

Electricity customers who install solar panels often are paid the prevailing retail price for the electricity they generate. We show that this "net metering" policy typically is not optimal. A payment for distributed generation (w) that is below the retail price of electricity (r) will induce...

Motivated by recent government interventions in the form of mandated subsidies for new generation capacity, I examine the impact of subsidized entry of electricity generation capacity on the performance of centralized capacity auctions. Subsidized entry suppresses capacity prices and induces an...

I analyze the ability of capacity payment mechanisms to alleviate underinvestment in electricity generation capacity. I derive the optimal capacity payment parameters under two capacity payment mechanisms, when capacity demand is price-elastic and when it is price-inelastic. Price-elastic...