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Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2010

We analyze an agency model of political competition to examine whether conflict encourages hawkish behavior, and if … such behavior can itself aggravate conflict. We consider situations of conflict between a state and an insurgent group …, such as a conflict over a piece of land. Negotiations are carried on behalf of the state, by a democratically elected …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008553249

Non-Linear Strategies in a Linear Quadratic Differential Game

Rowat, Colin - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2005

See Birmingham Discussion Paper 05-05R (January 2006) for current version.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086715

Free Riders Do not Like Uncertainty.

Eichberger, J.; Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1996

We examine the effect of introducing Knightian uncertainty into a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce the free-rider problem if utility is concave in public goods or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. It is possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357555

Free Riders do not Like Uncertainty.

Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1999

We examine the effect of Knightian uncertainty in a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce free-riding if utility is concave or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146575

The Behavioural Consequences of Unfair Punishment

Drouvelis, Michalis - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2010

Experimental evidence from public good games with punishment suggests that punishment works when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-cooperators. This paper reports an experiment in which punishment is assigned unfairly in the sense that it is not linked to individual behaviour and is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752387

Uncertainty and Strategic Interaction in Economics.

Eichberger, J.; Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1999

The endogeneity of equilibrium strategies makes modelling uncertainty about the behaviour of other economic players difficult. Recent developments in decision and game theory offer an opportunity to include strategic uncertainty as an explanatory variable in economic analysis. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086687

Can Mediation Improve Upon Cheap-Talk? A Note

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model we allow for mediation in which the informed agent reports one possible element of a partition to a mediator (a communication device) and then the mediator suggests an action to the uninformed decision-maker according to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086703

Monitoring Reports with a Self-Interested Inspector.

Gotz, M.; Summer, M. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1996

If an inspector is work averse and his effort spent on investigating reports is not observable this creates a moral hazard problem whenever there is an imperfect monitoring technology. This problem arises because the organization can not distinguish between an inspection that doesn't find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086713

Dominant Strategy Implementable Compromises

Postl, Peter - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2006

We study dominant strategy implementation in the compromise setting of Borgers and Postl (2006), in which two agents have to choose one of three mutually exclusive alternatives. The agents' ordinal rankings of these three alternatives are commonly known among them, and they are diametrically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357545

E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox.

Eichberger, J.; Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1996

This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is the Ellsberg representation. The paper further explores properties of this representation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357547