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Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2010

We analyze an agency model of political competition to examine whether conflict encourages hawkish behavior, and if … such behavior can itself aggravate conflict. We consider situations of conflict between a state and an insurgent group …, such as a conflict over a piece of land. Negotiations are carried on behalf of the state, by a democratically elected …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008553249

Non-Linear Strategies in a Linear Quadratic Differential Game

Rowat, Colin - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2005

See Birmingham Discussion Paper 05-05R (January 2006) for current version.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086715

Free Riders do not Like Uncertainty.

Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1999

We examine the effect of Knightian uncertainty in a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce free-riding if utility is concave or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146575

Free Riders Do not Like Uncertainty.

Eichberger, J.; Kelsey, D. - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 1996

We examine the effect of introducing Knightian uncertainty into a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce the free-rider problem if utility is concave in public goods or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. It is possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357555

The Behavioural Consequences of Unfair Punishment

Drouvelis, Michalis - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2010

Experimental evidence from public good games with punishment suggests that punishment works when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-cooperators. This paper reports an experiment in which punishment is assigned unfairly in the sense that it is not linked to individual behaviour and is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752387

Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2013

We consider a Battle of the Sexes game with two types, High and Low, for each player and allow cheap talk regarding players' types before the game. We prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium exists for a low range of prior probability of the High-Type. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818179

Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2012

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818184

Coordination and Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2013

We consider a Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow cheap talk regarding players' private information before the game is played. We prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium has a desirable coordination property. Such coordination can also be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818189

Ideological Dissent in Downsian Politics

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Bhalla, Manaswini; … - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2014

We analyze the Hotelling-Downs model of a winner-take-all elections with sequential entry where n 2 'office-seeking' candidates with privately known qualities arrive in an order to announce platform commitments and voters receive partially informative exogenous signals about quality of each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818193

Evolutionary Games with Group Selection

Jensen, Martin Kaae; Rigos, Alexandros - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2012

This paper introduces two new concepts in evolutionary game theory; Nash equilibrium with Group Selection (NEGS) and Evolutionary Stable Strategy with Group Selection (ESSGS). These concepts generalize Maynard Smith and Price (1973) to settings with arbitrary matching rules, in particular they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818194