We identify characteristics that affect firms' ability to learn from their export activities. Our analysis is based on a panel of Argentinian firms spanning 1992-2001 and we employ Granger causality tests, propensity score matching techniques and GMM regressions. The characteristics we find to...

This paper models aid agencies as financial intermediaries that do not make a financial return to depositors, whose concern is to transfer resources to investor-beneficiaries. This leads to a problem of verifying that the agency is using donations as intended. One solution to this problem is for...

We endogenise the objective of a monopoly firm in a general equilibrium context. Within this framework a distributional conflict occurs between shareholders, depending on their endowments. Following a political-economy approach and using voting theory, the production plan of the firm is...

There is an extensive literature that examines the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the productivity and competitiveness of domestic firms. Using estimation techniques from the productivity spillover literature, this paper tests for the presence of environmental...

Using Japanese firm-level data, we identify and quantify the factors that influence the environmental management of Japanese firms. We measure 14 different aspects of a firm’s environmental management and investigate how firm-level characteristics and external pressures affect the quantity and...

This paper investigates the relationship between firm heterogeneity and a firm's decision to export, using the annual survey of Thai manufacturing firms from 2001 to 2004. A significant contribution of this paper is that we are, for the first time, able to break down FDI by country of origin to...

The endogeneity of equilibrium strategies makes modelling uncertainty about the behaviour of other economic players difficult. Recent developments in decision and game theory offer an opportunity to include strategic uncertainty as an explanatory variable in economic analysis. This paper...

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model we allow for mediation in which the informed agent reports one possible element of a partition to a mediator (a communication device) and then the mediator suggests an action to the uninformed decision-maker according to the...

If an inspector is work averse and his effort spent on investigating reports is not observable this creates a moral hazard problem whenever there is an imperfect monitoring technology. This problem arises because the organization can not distinguish between an inspection that doesn't find...

We study dominant strategy implementation in the compromise setting of Borgers and Postl (2006), in which two agents have to choose one of three mutually exclusive alternatives. The agents' ordinal rankings of these three alternatives are commonly known among them, and they are diametrically...