Two agents have to choose one of three alternatives. Their ordinal rankings of these alternatives are commonly known among them. The rankings are diametrically opposed to each other. Ex-ante efficiency requires that they reach a compromise, that is choose the alternative which they both rank...

We study dominant strategy implementation in a variant of the canonical public good provision model, as proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this set up, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced dominant strategy deterministric mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For...

We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variants of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic...

We study dominant strategy implementation in the compromise setting of Borgers and Postl (2006), in which two agents have to choose one of three mutually exclusive alternatives. The agents' ordinal rankings of these three alternatives are commonly known among them, and they are diametrically...

This paper focuses on the possible effects on lobbying effort of a reform of the trade policy decision mechanism. In particular, an elemental evaluation of a two-stage lobbying process to seek administered and political protection is proposed, where the uncertainty concerning both the...

This paper examines the role played by community characteristics in influencing local environmental quality, focusing specifically on ethnic diversity. In contrast to the previous literature, this study argues that it is the fractionalization and/or polarization of ethnic groups that is the...

This note studies an allocation problem that generalizes the compromise setup of Borgers and Postl (2006) to a setting with more than two agents, and generalizes their impossibility result.

This paper considers the endogenous determination of administered trade rules and investigates the effects on lobbying behaviour of a less protection-friendly legislative and administered process (which could be triggered by international constraints or institutional changes, for instance).

This paper proposes a measure of uncertainty-aversion analogous to the Arrow-Pratt Measure of risk aversion. We apply it to multiple priors and non additive probability models of uncertaity. In these models there is non distinction between uncertainty and aversion to it. Hence our theory can...