This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated intomechanismdesign analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided...

This paper presents analysis of contractual settings with complete but unverifiable information and where trade consists of a sequence of verifiable productive actions, between which renegotiation can occur. The main result identifies an equivalent, simplified model that can be used to calculate...

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of complete, but unverifiable, information. The main point of the paper is that the consideration of renegotiation necessitates formal examination of other technological constraints, especially those...

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information. The framework explicitly accounts for the parties’ individual trade actions. The sets of implementable...