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Watson, Joel; Bull, Jesse - Department of Economics, University of California-San … - 2006

This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated intomechanismdesign analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536459

Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons

Watson, Joel - Department of Economics, University of California-San … - 2006

This paper reports the analysis of a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self …-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual … relationship. In particular, the model shows the importance of accounting for the selfenforced component of contract in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536484

Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade

Watson, Joel - Department of Economics, University of California-San … - 2006

This paper presents analysis of contractual settings with complete but unverifiable information and where trade consists of a sequence of verifiable productive actions, between which renegotiation can occur. The main result identifies an equivalent, simplified model that can be used to calculate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536493

Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail

Watson, Joel - Department of Economics, University of California-San … - 2006

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011130685