Similar Search Results

Social and Moral Norms in the Laboratory

Charness, Gary; Schram, Arthur - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2012

Social norms involve observation by others and external sanctions for violations,while moral norms involve introspection and internal sanctions. We develop a simple model ofindividual preferences that incorporates moral and social norms. We then examine dictatorchoices, where we create a shared...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678008

The Control Premium: A Preference for Payoff Autonomy

Owens, David; Grossman, Zachary; Fackler, Ryan - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2012

We document a lower bound for thecontrol premium: agents' willingness to pay to control their own payoff. Participants choose between an asset that will pay only if they later answer a particular quiz question correctly and one that pays only if their partner answers a different question...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678028

â€œOptimal Contracts with Team Production and Hidden Information: An Experimentâ€

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2008

about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social preferences in mechanism design and contract theory …. We devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal offers one of three … possible contract menus to a team of two agents of unknown types. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843445

MINIMUM ADVERTISED-PRICE POLICY RULES AND RETAILER BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENT BY HEWLETT-PACKARD

Charness, Gary B; Chen, Kay-Yut - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2001

We tested the effects of various of policy rules on retailer behavior in laboratory experiments conducted at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories. Our experimental design models the multifaceted contemporary market for consumer computer products and is quite complex, but we found that participants can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538276

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS WITH TEAM PRODUCTION AND HIDDEN INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENT

Charness, Gary B; Cabrales, Antonio - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2008

about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social forces in mechanism design and contract theory. We … devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in a hidden information context. A principal offers one of three possible … contract menus to a team of two agents of unknown types. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538305

A Route Choice Experiment With an Efficient Toll

Hartman, John Lawrence - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2007

Traffic congestion is a substantial time cost for many urban commuters. This paper studies the response of subjects in an experimental setting in which subjects choose between a short direct route that becomes increasingly congested as more people travel on it and a more indirect route that does...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538314

ALTRUISM, EQUITY, AND RECIPROCITY IN A GIFT-EXCHANGE EXPERIMENT: AN ENCOMPASSING APPROACH

Charness, Gary B; Haruvy, Ernan - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 1999

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compare leading approaches...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538330

BARGAINING EFFICIENCY AND SCREENING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

Charness, Gary B - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 1998

This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538336

RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFORT IN AN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKET

Charness, Gary B - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 1999

authority dampens internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchange experiment, we find that subjects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538348

PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATIONS AND CREDIBILITY: A TEST OF AUMANN'S CONJECTURE

Charness, Gary B - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 1998

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumann conjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal for efficient play is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538354