Similar Search Results

Private Law Enforcement, Fine Sharing, and Tax Collection: Theory and Historical Evidence

Cosgel, Metin; Miceli, Thomas; Etkes, Haggay - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2010

This paper contributes to the literature on private law enforcement by proposing a novel solution to the problem of underenforcement by monopolistic enforcers. Monopolistic enforcers underinvest in fine collection because, by maximizing net expected revenue, they ignore the social benefits of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008623521

Corruption and Growth Under Weak Identification

Shaw, Philip John; Katsaiti, Marina-Selini; Jurgilas, Marius - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2006

weak identification. He finds a negative impact of corruption on investment and economic growth that appears to be robust … investigate other instruments commonly used in the corruption literature and obtain similar results. After identifying an … instrument with sufficient strength we fail to reject a zero effect of corruption on investment and economic growth. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005800212

A Model of Rights

Shunda, Nicholas - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2005

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005746129

Do Criminal Representatives Hinder or Improve Constituency Outcomes? Evidence from India

Prakash, Nishith; Rockmore, Marc - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2014

The recent increase in the number of criminally accused politicians elected to state assemblies has caused much furor in India. Despite the potentially important consequences and the widely divergent views, the implications of their elections to state legislative assemblies on constituency-level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010900539

Asset Forfeiture Laws and Criminal Deterrence

Miceli, Thomas; Johnson, Derek - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2013

Asset forfeiture laws allow the seizure of assets used in the commission of a crime. This paper examines the impact of such laws on deterrence by incorporating the possibility of asset forfeiture into the standard economic model of crime. When punishment is by a fine that can be optimally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888393

Regulatory Takings

Miceli, Thomas; Segerson, Kathleen - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2011

A regulatory taking occurs when a government regulation reduces the value of private property to such a degree that the owner is entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. This chapter reviews legal and economic theories aimed at determining when a regulation crosses the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216365

Public Use or Abuse? The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development in the Era of \textit{Kelo}

Miceli, Thomas; Diop, Moussa; Lanza, Steven P.; … - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2010

The Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London (2005) authorized the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment projects provided that there are sufficient spillover benefits to the public in the form of enhanced taxes and new jobs. This paper examines the economic basis for this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008695152

Tax Collection in History

Cosgel, Metin; Miceli, Thomas - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2007

Methods of tax collection employed by modern governments seem dull when compared to the rich variety observed in history. Whereas most governments today typically use salaried agents to collect taxes, various other types of contractual relationships have been observed in history, including...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839018

Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location

Friehe, Tim; Miceli, Thomas - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2014

This paper explores the advantages of focusing law enforcement on some locations when offenders can choose locations. The substitutability of different crimes from the offender's perspective is established as the key variable determining whether asymmetric enforcement is socially desirable. When...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888386

Marginal Deterrence When Offenders Act Sequentially

Friehe, Tim; Miceli, Thomas - Department of Economics, University of Connecticut - 2014

Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for oenders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888389