We study competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain over their form and terms of trading. Both (conditionally) inefficient wholesale price contracts and efficient contracts that take the form of price-quantity bundles (and not of two-tariffs) arise in equilibrium under...

This paper explores how vertical relations influence the timing of new technology adoption. It shows that both the bargaining power distribution among the vertically related firms and the contract type through which vertical trading is conducted affect crucially the speed of adoption: the...

This paper explores how vertical relations influence the timing of new technology adoption. It shows that both the bargaining power distribution among the vertically related firms and the contract type through which vertical trading is conducted affect crucially the speed of adoption: the...

We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms' incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative market and societal implications. We find that the CSR certification standard is the lowest under a for-profit...

We study the endogenous formation of upstream R&D networks in a vertically related industry. We find that, when upstream firms set prices, the complete network that includes all firms emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when upstream firms set quantities, the complete network will arise but...

The present paper investigates the firms' incentives to invest in comparative advertising in a spatially differentiated duopoly market characterized by network externalities. We show that for a wide range of locations, determined by the interaction between the transportation cost, the network...

This paper investigates unionized oligopolistic markets with differentiated products and quality improvement-R&D investments. In endogenous union structures, we investigate the conditions under which firm-level unions may strategically collude, or not, and the impact of their decisions upon the...

This paper studies oligopolistic markets with differentiated products, with endogenous union structures and quality improvement-R&D investments. In the context of a dynamic game-theoretic analysis we investigate the conditions under which firm-level unions may strategically collude, or not, and...

In a unionized Cournot duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining regime, we analyzed undeclared labour in a matrix game. We reveal the opportunity cost between taxation and contributions for social insurance that firms and unions face, while we examine all relevant possible unilateral...

The present paper examines endogenously the firms ��incentives to invest in informative and comparative advertising, in an oligopolistic market with horizontally differentiated products where competition take place in quantities. We show that, in equilibrium the...