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Collusion and the political differentiation of newspapers
Antonielli, Marco; Filistrucchi, Lapo - NET Institute - 2011
collusive agreements in terms of welfare and pluralism. We analyse and compare two forms of collusion: in the first, publishers … thus show that collusion on prices reinforces the tendency towards a Pensée Unique discussed in Gabszewicz, Laussel and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905448
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Optimal Cartel Prices in Two-Sided Markets Access
Boffa, Federico; Filistrucchi, Lapo - NET Institute - 2014
We study optimal cartel prices in a two-sided market. We present a simple model showing that prices above the two-sided monopoly price may prevail on one side of a two-sided market as a means to enhance the sustainability of the cartel. We prove that in such a case a higher benefit from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010936552
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Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions
Decarolis, Francesco; Goldmanis, Maris; Penta, Antonio - NET Institute - 2013
As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized … in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905454
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Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: A New Pricing Mechanism for Online Advertising
Celis, L. Elisa; Lewis, Gregory; Mobius, Markus; … - NET Institute - 2011
Increasingly sophisticated tracking technology offers publishers the ability to offer targeted advertisements to advertisers. Such targeting enhances advertising efficiency by improving the match quality between advertisers and users, but also thins the market of interested advertisers. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391685
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The Effect of Electronic Commerce on Geographic Trade and Price Variance in a Business-to-Business Market
Overby, Eric; Forman, Chris - NET Institute - 2011
Imbalances in supply and demand often cause the price for the same good to vary across geographic locations. Economic theory suggests that if the price differential is greater than the cost of transporting the good between locations, then buyers will shift demand from high-price locations to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358872
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Informational size and two-stage mechanisms
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015
We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011193604
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Pricing and Incentives in Publicly Subsidized Health Care Markets: the Case of Medicare Part D
Decarolis, Francesco - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012
In Medicare Part D, low income individuals receive subsidies to enroll into insurance plans. This paper studies how premiums are distorted by the combined effects of this subsidy and the default assignment of low income enrollees into plans. Removing this distortion could reduce the cost of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010559468
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604557
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Simple Auctions, Second Version
Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010
modeling agents who lack detailed knowledge of prior distributions. In auctions, that agents know priors has two consequences … such complex inferences are precluded. This is done in a parsimonious model of auctions in which agents are restricted to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822935
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196