is a noisy indicator of the firm’s investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers ‘discipline …

How does the central bank's incentive to build a reputation affect speculators' ability to coordinate and the …' coordination and the central bank's reputation building? I address these questions in a dynamic regime change game that highlights … the interaction between the central bank's reputation building and speculators' individual learning. On the one hand, the …

This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short …

central bank reputation and transparency. Monetary policy alternates between periods of active inflation stabilization and …. Reputation determines the speed with which agents’ pessimism accelerates once the central bank starts deviating. When the model …’ expectations. Gains from transparency are even more sizeable for countries whose central banks have weak reputation. …

increasing function of the value of a candidate’s reputation. …

maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about … types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. …

's reputation. We also show how the model can be extended so that rhetoric also signals candidate quality. …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …