A major virtue of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, for example, in the theory of general financial equilibrium (GFE), is that they ensure intertemporal consistency: consumption-portfolio plans (for the future) are in fact executed (in the future) — assuming that there is perfect foresight...

A major virtue of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, for example, in the theory of general financial equilibrium (GFE), is that they ensure time consistency: consumption-portfolio plans (for the future) are in fact executed (in the future) — assuming that there is perfect foresight about...

This paper explores the role of portfolio constraints in generating multiplicity of equilibrium. We present a simple asset market economy with two goods and two households, households who face constraints on their ability to take unbounded positions in risky stocks. Absent such constraints,...

In this paper we examine non-parametric restrictions on counterfactual analysis in a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Under the assumption of time-separable expected utility and complete markets all equilibria in this model are stationary, the Arrow-Debreu prices uniquely...

We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the inability to jointly determine...

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market....

The majority of results in the literature on general equilibrium are not for an economy (i.e. given an endowment and preferences), but rather, for a set of economies (i.e. a set of endowments given preferences). Therefore, we argue that the most appropriate robustness result requires perturbing...

We study transactions that require investments before trading in a competitive market, when forward contracts fixing the transaction price are absent. We show that, despite the market being perfectly competitive and subject to arbitrarily little uncertainty, the inability to jointly determine...

This paper examines the equilibrium correspondence in Arrow-Debreu exchange economies with semi-algebraic preferences. We show that a generic semi-algebraic exchange economy gives rise to a square system of polynomial equations with finitely many solutions. The competitive equilibria form a...

We examine markets in which agents make investments and then match into pairs, creating surpluses that depend on their investments and that can be split between the matched agents. In general, each of the matched agents would ”own" part of the surplus in the absence of interagent transfers....