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Dilmé, Francesc - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

Consider the following situation involving two agents who belong to a large society. One of the agents needs help to avoid a big loss. The other agent may either incur a low cost to help him or do nothing. If agents do not recognize each other, providing incentives for socially optimal behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541088

Cooperation in Large Societies, Second Version

Dilmé, Francesc - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

This paper investigates how cooperation can be sustained in large societies even in the presence of agents who never … other. We introduce and characterize a class of equilibria, named linear equilibria, in which cooperation takes place … when the society is large, and which generate smooth dynamics of the expected average level of cooperation. Unlike …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010791596

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126685

Active Courts and Menu Contracts

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006

We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126690

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126706

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061919

Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2009

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title - courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102105

Coasian Bargaining with An Arriving Outside Option

Hwang, Ilwoo; Li, Fei - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

We consider Coasian bargaining problems where the buyer has an outside option arriving at a stochastic time. We study both observable outside option models and unobservable outside option models. In both models, we show that a Coasian equilibrium exists if (1) the arrival of the outside option...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822897

Reputation and Turnover

Rob, Rafael; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004

We consider a repeated duopoly game where each firm privately chooses its investment in quality, and realized quality is a noisy indicator of the firm’s investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers ‘discipline’ a firm by switching to its rival in the case that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005020643

Common Learning

Cripps, Martin W.; Ely, Jeffrey C.; Mailath, George J.; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2007

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005020651