dynamics result from the interaction between two learning processes: exogenous learning about the existence of short …-lived buyers, and endogenous learning about the long-lived buyer's value. …

-attribute auctions in which buyers take into account seller's price as well as various characteristics, including quality. Our …' qualities, the distribution of seller's costs conditional on quality, and the distribution of buyers' tastes. Our empirical … results from the on-line market for programming services confirm that quality plays an important role. We use our estimates to …

This paper demonstrates that a misspecified model of information processing interferes with long-run learning and … to learn the true state. I consider a social learning environment where agents draw inference from private signals … efficient learning. Prior actions aggregate multiple sources of information; agents face an inferential challenge to distinguish …

seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller randomly receives an outside … option, the value of which depends on the hidden quality. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an … equilibrium in which the uninformed buyer fails to learn the quality and continues to make the same randomized offer throughout …

Better informed consumers may be treated preferentially by firms since their consumption serves as a quality signal for … investigate this phenomenon in an equilibrium model of social learning with heterogeneous consumers and firms that act … strategically. Consumers search for high quality firms and condition their choices on observed actions of other consumers. When they …

We consider a repeated duopoly game where each firm privately chooses its investment in quality, and realized quality …’ a firm by switching to its rival in the case that the realized quality of its product is too low. This type of … equilibrium is characterized by consumers’ tolerance level - the level of product quality below which consumers switch to the …

the interaction between the central bank's reputation building and speculators' individual learning. On the one hand, the …, speculators individually learn the central bank's value, and such learning may encourage speculators to coordinate an attack. I … show that though learning makes the central bank's value approximate common knowledge over time, there is a unique …

observable outcomes. Agents in the model are fully rational, conduct Bayesian learning, and they know that they do not know …