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Coasian Bargaining with An Arriving Outside Option

Hwang, Ilwoo; Li, Fei - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

We consider Coasian bargaining problems where the buyer has an outside option arriving at a stochastic time. We study … available, and the standard Coasian bargaining literature, where the buyer has no outside option. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822897

Identifying Structural Models of Committee Decisions with Heterogeneous Tastes and Ideological Bias

An, Yonghong; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

We study the nonparametric identification and estimation of a structural model for committee decisions. Members of a committee share a common information set, but differ in ideological bias while processing multiple information sources and in individual tastes while weighing multiple objectives....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822893

Skewed Noise

Dillenberger, David; Segal, Uzi - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015

We study the attitude of decision makers to skewed noise. For a binary lottery that yields the better outcome with probability $p$, we identify noise around $p$, with a compound lottery that induces a distribution over the exact value of the probability and has an average value p. We propose and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011204502

Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Third Version

Merlo, Antonio; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

Stochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914399

Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Fourth Version

Merlo, Antonio; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011

Stochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318182

"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008751337

A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock

Hwang, Ilwoo - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The … seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller randomly receives an outside … the bargaining process. As a result, the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles the outcome of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010691391

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700277

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version

Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make from the hypothesis that the current allocation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587848

Matching with Incomplete Information

Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically assumes that the agents have complete information, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568127