This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the long-lived player. We provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium...

This paper develops and implements a new approach for separately identifying preference and opportunity parameters of a two-sided search and matching model in the absence of data on choice sets. This approach exploits information on the dynamics of matches: how long it takes for singles to form...

We study students' dropout behavior and its consequences in a dynamic signaling model. Workers pay an education cost per unit of time and cannot commit to a fixed education length. Workers face an exogenous dropout risk before graduation. Since low-productivity students' cost is high, pooling...

This paper demonstrates that a misspecified model of information processing interferes with long-run learning and offers an explanation for why individuals may continue to choose an inefficient action, despite sufficient public information to learn the true state. I consider a social learning...

We develop a theoretical framework to quantitatively assess the general equilibrium effects and welfare implications of central bank reputation and transparency. Monetary policy alternates between periods of active inflation stabilization and periods during which the emphasis on inflation...

We develop a DSGE model in which the policy rate signals to price setters the central bank’s view about macroeconomic developments. The model is estimated with likelihood methods on a U.S. data set that includes the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a measure of price setters’ inflation...

This paper analyzes a dynamic education signaling model with dropout risk. Workers pay an education cost per unit of time and face an exogenous dropout risk before graduation. Since low-productivity workers’ cost of education is high, pooling with early dropouts helps them avoid a high...

This paper develops methods to study the evolution of agents’ expectations and uncertainty in general equilibrium models. A central insight consists of recognizing that the evolution of agents' beliefs can be captured by defining a set of regimes that are characterized by the degree of agents'...

Asymmetric information is an important source of inefficiency when an asset (such as a firm) is transacted. The two main sources of this asymmetry are the unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of the asset (such as future profitability) and unobserved idiosyncratic choices (like secret price...

This paper studies the dynamics of workers. on-the-job search behavior and its consequences in an equilibrium labor market. In a model with both directed search and learning about the match quality of firm-worker pairs, I highlight the job search target effect of learning: as a worker updates...