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Why Do Life Insurance Policyholders Lapse? The Roles of Income, Health and Bequest Motive Shocks

Fang, Hanming; Kung, Edward - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

emerging life settlement market on consumer welfare. We present and empirically implement a dynamic discrete choice model of … life insurance decisions to assess the importance of various factors in explaining life insurance lapsations. In order to … model using the life insurance holding information from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data. Counterfactual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653227

Equilibrium Labor Market Search and Health Insurance Reform

Aizawa, Naoki; Fang, Hanming - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

expenditure shocks are matched with firms making health insurance coverage decisions. Our model delivers a rich set of predictions …, health insurance offering rates, turnover rates and workers' health compositions. We estimate our model by Generalized Method … Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey. We use our estimated model to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822875

How Does Life Settlement Affect the Primary Life Insurance Market?

Fang, Hanming; Kung, Edward - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

dynamic reclassification risk insurance in the equilibrium of the primary insurance market, and that the settlement market …We study the effect of the life settlement market on the structure of long term contracts offered by the primary market … for life insurance, as well as the effect on consumer welfare, using a dynamic model of life insurance with one sided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456314

Analyzing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks: On the Trade-off between Short Run Insurance Benefits vs. Long Run Incentive Costs

Cole, Harold L.; Kim, Soojin; Krueger, Dirk - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

This paper constructs a dynamic model of health insurance to evaluate the short- and long run effects of policies that … prevent firms from conditioning wages on health conditions of their workers, and that prevent health insurance companies from … charging individuals with adverse health conditions higher insurance premia. Our study is motivated by recent US legislation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593660

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

insurance against the unforeseen contingencies which the ex-ante contract cannot take into account. In this context, we are able … tradeoff between the need for incentives and the gains from insurance that voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126685

English Auctions with Ensuing Risks and Heterogeneous Bidders

Hu, Audrey; Matthews, Steven A.; Zou, Liang - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015

We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficient ex post equilibrium when the bidders are heterogeneous in both their exposures to, and their attitudes toward, the ensuing risk the asset will generate for the winning bidder. Each bidder's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199195

Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence

Cripps, Martin W.; Ely, Jeffrey C.; Mailath, George J.; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018623

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

Mailath, George J.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

This note provides several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and De Marzo and Duffie (1999), that were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672484

Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005

We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082

Cooperation in Large Societies, Second Version

Dilmé, Francesc - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

This paper investigates how cooperation can be sustained in large societies even in the presence of agents who never cooperate. In order to do this, we consider a large but finite society where in each period agents are randomly matched in pairs. Nature decides, within each match, which agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010791596