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Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Fourth Version
Merlo, Antonio; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011
Stochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318182
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Identification of Stochastic Sequential Bargaining Models, Second Version
Merlo, Antonio; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2009
Stochastic sequential bargaining games (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in various fields … "cake", to be rationalized by a sequential bargaining model. We show the common discount rate is identified, provided the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494288
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"Identification of Stochastic Sequential Bargaining Models"
Merlo, Antonio; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2009
Stochastic sequential bargaining games (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in various fields …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008500932
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The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party
Lee, Jihong; Liu, Qingmin - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008
In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties … bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining postures endogenously evolve over time. A privately informed long …" information). The long-lived player wants to guard his private information by bargaining tough but at the expense of more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102087
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Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Third Version
Merlo, Antonio; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010
Stochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914399
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When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150201
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Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
Mailath, George J.; : Wojciech Olszewski - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150206
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Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version
Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150217
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Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version
McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005
We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082
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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory
Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012
We study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players. We assume that social memory is finite---every player, except possibly one, is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past. This class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650273