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A Note on Unawareness and Zero Probability
Li, Jing - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008
I study how choice behavior given unawareness of an event differs from choice behavior given subjective belief of zero … probability on that event. Depending on different types of unawareness the decision-maker suffers, behavior under unawareness is … either incomparable with that under zero probability (in the case of pure unawareness), or drastically different (in the case …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126692
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Modeling Unawareness in Arbitrary State Spaces
Li, Jing - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008
I develop a set-theoretic model of unawareness without making any structural assumptions on the underlying state space …. Unawareness is characterized as a measurability constraint that results in players' reasoning about a “coarse" subjective algebra … variant of the partition model to examine the case of partial unawareness, where the player is aware of a question but unaware …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102103
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Information Structures with Unawareness
Li, Jing - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008
I construct a state space model with unawareness following Aumann (1976). Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a) show … that standard state space models are incapable of representing unawareness. The model circumvents the impossibility result … by endowing the agent with a subjective state space that differs from the full state space when he has the unawareness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102108
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Interactive Knowledge with Unawareness
Li, Jing - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008
unawareness, which significantly differ from those in the standard information partition model by allowing for false interactive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102115
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Coordination and Social Learning
Huang, Chong - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011
This paper studies the interaction between coordination and social learning in a dynamic regime change game. Social learning provides public information to which players overreact due to the coordination motive. So coordination affects the aggregation of private signals through players' optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009188957
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Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version
McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005
We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082
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Belief free equilibria
Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013
The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010656001
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Stochastic Games with Hidden States
Yamamoto, Yuichi - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015
This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find that if the game is connected, the limit feasible payoff set exists and is invariant to the initial prior about the state. Building on this invariance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165806
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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170302
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A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory
Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012
We study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players. We assume that social memory is finite---every player, except possibly one, is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past. This class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650273