Showing 1 - 10 of 14
The recent financial crisis has forced a rethink of banking regulation and supervision and the role of nancial innovation. We develop a model where prudent banks may signal their type through high capital ratios. Capital regulation may ensure separation in equilibrium but deposit insurance will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862692
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We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146848
signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We … the additional information to stochastically separate themselves from low types, but in doing so they separate themselves …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146888
We provide the first thick description of the KGB’s counter-intelligence function in the Soviet command economy. Based on documentation from Lithuania, the paper considers KGB goals and resources in relation to the supervision of science, industry, and transport; the screening of business...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758528
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In the model a fiscal stabilisation is announced under asymmetry of information between the government and the private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747118
information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747143
In a model of majority voting with common values and costly but voluntary participation, we show that in the vicinity of equilibrium, it is always Pareto-improving for more agents, on the average, to vote. This demonstrates that the negative voting externality identified by Borgers(2001) in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747146
This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but whether there are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747179