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Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict

Ghosal, Sayantan; Proto, Eugenio - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2008

This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse … bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both … of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democracy, the newly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368658

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Branston, J. Robert; Cowling, Keith; Sugden, Roger - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2002

A theory of the firm based on strategic decision-making highlights governance as a central issue. Preferences vary over strategy but not all interests are currently being represented, resulting in a failure to govern in the public interest. As solutions, we consider the design of company law and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146865

Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy

Bracco, Emanuele; Porcelli, Francesco; Redoano, Michela - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2013

This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758500