Does improving creditor coordination by strengthening CACs lead to efficiency gains in the functioning of sovereign … bond markets? We address this question in a model featuring both debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under …’s incentives are taken into account, we demonstrate the robust possibility of a conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency. We …

In a model with both issues of sovereign debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information, we … show that the resulting conflict between ex ante and interim efficiency limits the welfare impact of strengthening CACs …. Conditional on default, we show that an interim efficient CAC threshold exists and improving creditor coordination results in …

This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse …

This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and … conflict and relates them. In conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion. The application of … coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are …

Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Ex- periments confirm that …

geographic, economic, and historical trait, including proxies of pre-colonial conflict, predicts partitioning by the national … borders. Second, we exploit a detailed geo-referenced database that records various types of conflict across African regions … and show that civil conflict is concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities. We also document that …