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DO ELECTIONS ALWAYS NOTIVATE INCUMBENTS? LEARNING VS CAREER CONCERNS

Borgne, Eric Le; Lockwood, Ben - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2004

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between officeholder and the electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the officeholder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368541

A Behavioural Power Index

Kaniovski, Serguei; Leech, Dennis - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2007

We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or assumed voting patterns conveyed by a joint probability distribution on the set of voting outcomes, and apply it to the voting data of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368577

DOES CENTRALISATION AFFECT THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF LOBBIES?

Redoano, Michela - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2003

reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case. This paper explains the empirical evidence in … decentralization, where the policy choice can be affected by the pressure of endogenously formed lobbies. We measure lobbying in three … policy can be smaller. Moreover we show how the majority groups try to offset lobbying by strategic voting for a candidate of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368590

POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITION FORMATION

Dhillon, Amrita - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2004

This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) formation. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties are compared...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368612

Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and Bargaining

Ghosal, Sayantan; Proto, Eugenio - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2006

Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-surance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368619

SCORING RULE VOTING GAMES AND DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY

Buenrostro, Lucia; Dhillon, Amrita - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2004

This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda rule and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368641

Green and Producer Lobbies: Enemies or Allies?.

Conconi, P. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2000

In this paper we employ a common agency model to study the role of green and producer lobbies in the determination of trade and environmental policies. We focus on two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution externalities. We show that the nature of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368762

Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games: A New Algorithm.

Leech, D. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 1998

Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body which uses weighted voting. Although the approach, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time it has not been very widely applied, in part because of the difficulty of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368783

Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements.

Leech, D. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2001

This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, from the perspective of enlargement of the Union. It uses an approach based on power indices due to Penrose, Banzhaf and Coleman to make two analyses: (1) the question of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146837

EQUILIBRIUM AGENDA FORMATION

Dutta, Bhaskar; Jackson, Matthew O.; Breton, Michel Le - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2002

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146847