In general in organizations whose system of governance involves weighted majority voting, power and voting weight differ. Power indices are a value concept for majority voting games which provide a means of analyzing this difference. This paper provides new algorithms for computing the two...

We demonstrate that if any realization of a strategy for a Bayesiangame is, with high probability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also...

This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how “much” cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group...

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty E-core. Our main result is...

The “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded ; recall, for example, the diamonds and water paradox. In this paper, furthering research initiated in Kelso and Crawford (1982, Econometrica 50, 1483-1504) for matching models, we demonstrate a law of scarcity for cores and approximate...

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without side payments and provide three no emptiness of approximate core theorems for games in parameterized collections. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the...

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that...