Showing 1 - 6 of 6
This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and … conflict and relates them. In conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion. The application of … coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758408
Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Ex- periments confirm that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758491
geographic, economic, and historical trait, including proxies of pre-colonial conflict, predicts partitioning by the national … borders. Second, we exploit a detailed geo-referenced database that records various types of conflict across African regions … and show that civil conflict is concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities. We also document that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010758514
People exhibit group reciprocity when they retaliate, not against a person who harmed them, but against another person in that person's group. We tested for group reciprocity in laboratory experiments. Subjects played a Prisoner's Dilemma with partners from different groups. They then allocated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862687
Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-surance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368619
This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368658