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Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2015

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p E [0,1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011195692

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2012

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186266

Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Lugosi, Gábor - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2005

We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772039

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1996

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772398

Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture

Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumann conjectures that, in a variant of the Stag … will nonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-way communication. When the sender first chooses a … signal and then an action, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for the potentially efficient (but risky) play …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772240

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

Bornstein, Gary; Gneezy, Uri; Nagel, Rosemarie - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van … played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772547

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

Gomes, Armando; Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1997

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827436

La Crema: A case study of mutual fire insurance

Cabrales, Antonio; Calvó, Antoni; Jackson, Matthew O. - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2000

We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827468

Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Hauk, Esther; Hurkens, Sjaak - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1996

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827492

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

Iriberri, Nagore; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2008

We use subjects’ actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification of individuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfare maximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects’ actions in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827497