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Abbink, Klaus; Ellman, Matthew - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2004

Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772176

The organization of research corporations and researcher ability

Cassiman, Bruno - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

This paper analyzes the formation of Research Corporations as an alternative governance structure for performing R&D compared to pursuing in-house R&D projects. Research Corporations are private for-profit research centers that bring together several firms with similar research goals. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005707949

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

Garoupa, Nuno - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1997

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime. We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704855

The evolution of personally disadvantageous punishment among cofoundresses of the ant Acromyrmex versicolor

Pollock, Gregory B.; Cabrales, Antonio; Rissing, Steven W. - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

either replace a cheater or not (punishment), under both foundress viscosity (likely for A. versicolor) and random assortment …. We find replacement superior to punishment only when there is no foraging risk and cheating is not costly to group … survival. Generally, punishment is evolutionarily superior, especially as forager risk increases, under both forms of dispersal. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772044

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

Garoupa, Nuno - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772488

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772519

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

Garoupa, Nuno - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1997

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show that law enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572600

Cost system design and cost management in the Spanish public sector

Boned, Josep Lluís; Bagur, Llorenç; Tayles, Mike - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2006

Cost systems have been shown to have developed considerably in recent years and activity-based costing (ABC) has been shown to be a contribution to cost management, particularly in service businesses. The public sector is composed to a very great extent of service functions, yet considerably...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772170

Corruption and competition in procurement

Celentani, Marco; Ganuza, Juan J. - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2000

level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the … competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and … show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704948

Economic integration and corruption: The corrupt soul of the European Union

Ganuza, Juan J.; Hauk, Esther - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2000

We study the link between corruption and economic integration. We show that if an economic union establishes a common … regulation for public procurement, the country more prone to corruption benefits more from integration. However, if the … propensities to corruption are too distinct, the less corrupt country will not be willing to join the union. This difference in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708027