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bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two …-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772305
enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704976
We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005707946
Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties. Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will only happen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country. Guided by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103308