This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is...

We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency, converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems. The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with the same axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the...

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral parties obtaining...

This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in an age of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies in order to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century and in the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firm were...

We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other...

We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard models of strategic thinking, in this framework the player's "depth of reasoning" is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach,...

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remain ignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model,...

In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model with risk averse entrepreneurial firms and with public firms. The model predicts that an increase in uncertainty reduces the propensity of entrepreneurial firms to innovate, while it does not affect the propensity of public firms to innovate....

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices...