Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a “reflection effect” which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to an uncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain...

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to...

Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations,...

We represent interval ordered homothetic preferences with a quantitative homothetic utility function and a multiplicative bias. When preferences are weakly ordered (i.e. when indifference is transitive), such a bias equals 1. When indifference is intransitive, the biasing factor is a positive...

In the homogeneous case of one-dimensional objects, we show that any preference relation that is positive and homothetic can be represented by a quantitative utility function and unique bias. This bias may favor or disfavor the preference for an object. In the first case, preferences are...

A general formalism on stochastic choice is presented. Tje Rationalizability and Recoverability (Identification) problems are discussed. For the identification issue parametric examples are analyzed by means of techniques of mathematical tomography (Random transforms).

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is...

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of...

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p E [0,1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...

Economic predictions are highly sensitive to model and informational specifications. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that, in static games with incomplete information, only very weak predictions, namely, the interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief...