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Strike outcomes and wage settlements in Spain

Jiménez-Martín, Sergi - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2004

determination of wage and strike outcomes in a dynamic framework and the possibility of segregate wage equation for strike and non-strike … outcomes. Conditional to strikes taking place, we confirm a negative relationship between strike duration and wage changes in a … dynamic context. Furthermore, we find selection in wage equations induced by the strike outcome. In this sense, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772201

Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation

Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572583

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

Rodríguez, Diego - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features: bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there is individual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compare individual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargaining and we analyze the effects on wage formation. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772329

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internal impulses toward honesty,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772491

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Paul, Gilles Saint - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmful for job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodox reforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because of political opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772279

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

Matthes, Christian; Rondina, Francesca - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2012

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010896610

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2005

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015540

Interviews and adverse selection

Josephson, Jens; Shapiro, Joel - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2008

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms’ bottom lines and candidates’ careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015543

Failure to collude in the presence of asymmetric information

Jeon, Doh Shin - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2001

In this paper, we design the optimal contract when two agents can collude under asymmetric information. They have correlated types, produce complementary inputs and are protected by limited liability. Therefore, a joint manipulation of reports allows them to internalize informational and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015544

Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation

Jeon, Doh Shin - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat …

I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015555