This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where...

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand,...

This paper analyses the effect of tobacco prices on the propensity to start and quit smoking using a pool of the 1993, 1995 and 1997 editions of the Spanish National Health Surveys. The estimates for several parametric models of the hazard rate for starting and quitting suggest that i) The...

The objective of this study consists in quantifying in money terms the potential reduction in usage of public health care outlets associated to the tenure of double (public plus private) insurance. In order to address the problem, a probabilistic model for visits to physicians is specified and...

As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments by devolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regional and local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceeds...

The objective of this study consists in quantifying in money terms the potential reduction in usage of public health care outlets associated to the tenure of double (public plus private) insurance. In order to address the problem, a probabilistic model for visits to physicians is specified and...

This paper analyses the effect of tobacco prices on the propensity to start and quit smoking using a pool of the 1993, 1995 and 1997 editions of the Spanish National Health Surveys. The estimates for several parametric models of the hazard rate for starting and quitting suggest that i) The...

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living...

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in a growing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use to analyze the political support for employment protection legislations such as the ones that are observed in most European countries. We analyze the possibility of...

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmful for job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodox reforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because of political opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why we...