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Lobbying, innovation and protectionist cycles

Sánchez, Gabriel - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

so by focusing on the use of lobbying for protection by import competing firms as a means to postpone costly product …, it will be optimal to adjust quality and to decrease the lobbying effort at some time, leading to liberalization and … technological catch-up. But then the equilibrium tariff will again be small and "cheap", and it will pay to start lobbying anew …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772449

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Paul, Gilles Saint - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmful for job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodox reforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because of political opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772279

The informational value of incumbency

Llavador, Humberto; Beviá, Carmen - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2006

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827438

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

Hassler, John; Mora, José V. Rodríguez; Storesletten, … - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2001

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility, unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote over unemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827462

Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?

Calveras, Aleix; Ganuza, Juan José; Llobet, Gerard - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2005

This paper analyzes the current trend towards firms’ self-regulation as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market(conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827490

Ambiguity in election games

Aragonés, Enriqueta; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827513

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Aragonés, Enriqueta; Neeman, Zvika - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1994

Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827527

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2012

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010849602

Building a reputation as a socially responsible firm

Calveras, Aleix; Ganuza, Juan José - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2014

.g., through lobbying of the media), which might reduce the supply of the credence attributes and even harm firms themselves. As a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010849622

Should different people have different governments?

Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2011

The classic theory of fiscal federalism suggests that different people should have different governments. Yet, separate local governments with homogeneous constituents often end up doing poorly. This paper explains why and answers three questions: when regions are heterogeneous, what determines...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010849630