Similar Search Results

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

Bornstein, Gary; Gneezy, Uri; Nagel, Rosemarie - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van … played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772547

Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment

Galbiati, Roberto; Schlag, Karl; Weele, Joël van der - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2009

We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game in the presence of a third player …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772160

Endogenous information structures

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1999

Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations with privately informed agents. In those models the information structure is assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether such models, and the results they produce, are robust with respect the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248476

Endogenous depth of reasoning

Alaoui, Larbi; Penta, Antonio - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2012

model's predictions with an experiment. We administer different treatments that vary beliefs over payoffs and opponents, as … well as beliefs over opponents' beliefs. The results of this experiment, which are not accounted for by current models of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010849599

An experiment on Nash implementation

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Corchón, Luis - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772110

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

Nagel, Rosemarie; Cabrales, Antonio; Armenter, Roc - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2002

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to …. In our experiment each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategy profile … outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying coordination game. The behavior of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772141

Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis

Cabrales, Antonio; Fontes, Walter Garcia; Motta, Massimo - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1997

Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and international trade. This type of games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772493

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2012

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186266

Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2015

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p E [0,1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011195692

Uncertain rationality and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2015

Economic predictions are highly sensitive to model and informational specifications. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that, in static games with incomplete information, only very weak predictions, namely, the interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011195695