The goal of this paper is to present an optimal resource allocation model for the regional allocation of public service inputs. The proposed solution leads to maximise the relative public service availability in regions located below the best availability frontier, subject to exogenous budget...

The goal of this paper is to present an optimal resource allocation model for the regional allocation of public service inputs. The proposed solution leads to maximise the relative public service availability in regions located below the best availability frontier, subject to exogenous budget...

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfare implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic sophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and...

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmful for job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodox reforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because of political opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why we...

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the...

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other...

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometry of correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different...

We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say ${\cal I}$ and ${\cal J}$. First we say that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ when for every compact game $G$, all correlated equilibrium distributions of $G$ induced by ${\cal J}$ are also induced by ${\cal I}$. Second, we say...

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a cost reducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to use the skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We show that there are two types of diffusion avoiding...

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth,...