This paper analyzes collective bargaining using Spanish firm level data. Central to the analysis are the joint determination of wage and strike outcomes in a dynamic framework and the possibility of segregate wage equation for strike and non-strike outcomes. Conditional to strikes taking place,...

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features: bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there is individual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compare individual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargaining and we analyze the effects on wage formation. As...

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internal impulses toward honesty,...

This paper investigates whether information about fairness types can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into...

The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and...

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate...

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. This paper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior. Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those of the client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We show that the...

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished,...

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show that law enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the...

I consider a general specification of criminals' objective function and argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory is substituted for the traditional expected utility theory, the high-fine-low-probability result (Becker, 1968) only holds under specific and strong restrictions.