We investigate whether trade has any effect on the price formation process in a specific electricity market, and identify interconnected markets that have higher impacts on prices in that market. In particular, we study Ontario wholesale electricity market and its trade with 12 interconnected...

We study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators that face uncertainty over demand and water flows where the hydro generator is constrained by water flows and the thermal generator by capacity. We compute the Feedback equilibrium for the in?nite horizon game and show that...

We review supply function equilibrium models and their predictions on market outcomes in the wholesale electricity auctions. We discuss how observable market characteristics such as capacity constraints, number of power suppliers, load distribution and auction format affect the behavior of...

We analyze collusion in two comparable market structures. In the first market structure only one firm is vertically integrated; there is one more independent firm in the upstream industry and another independent firm in the downstream industry. In the second market structure, there are only two...

We study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators under de- mand uncertainty. Producers compete in quantities and each is constrained: the ther- mal generator by capacity and the hydro generator by water availability. We analyze a two-period game emphasizing the incentives...

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators’ bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation...

We use detailed data from all generators in the Ontario wholesale electricity market to investigate cross-border electricity trade and its impact on air emissions and welfare in Ontario. Using the technical characteristics of the generators and financial data we run a competition model every...

We investigate price responsiveness of wholesale electricity customers in the hourly Ontario wholesale electricity market. We use detailed generator and market level data to calculate market power measures such as the Lerner Index, Residual Supplier Index, and Pivotal Supplier Index which are...

We study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators under demand uncertainty. Producers compete in quantities and each is constrained: the thermal generator by capacity and the hydro generator by water availability. We analyze a two-period game emphasizing the incentives for...

The Weitzman Dismal Theorem (DT) suggests agents today should be willing to pay an unbounded amount to insure against fat-tailed risks of catastrophes such as climate change. The DT has been criticized for its assumption that marginal utility (MU) goes to negative infinite faster than the rate...