Some countries may face choice between targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. This paper shows that the choice of a country in favour of monetary union may be motivated by asymmetrical supply shocks. The demand shocks are neutralised under these...

Cet article étudie la stabilité macroéconomique lorsque la Banque Centrale intègre dans sa règle du taux d'intérêt optimale les cours boursiers. Nous montrons que lorsque la Banque Centrale a une forte aversion pour l'inflation en attribuant un poids important à l'objectif de l'inflation...

In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and decentralized supply-side fiscal policies in a monetary union. We find that the opacity of a conservative CCB has a restrictive effect on national fiscal policies since each government...