We describe recent work on the theory of trade agreements that speaks to the purpose and design of GATT. Our discussion proceeds in three steps. First, we examine the purpose of a trade agreement. In both the traditional economic and the political-economy approaches to the study of trade...

This paper discusses the scope, methods, the effects of international coordination of economic policies. In addressing the scope for and of coordination, the analysis covers the rationale for coordination, barriers to coordination, the range and specificity of policies to be coordinated, the...

In recent years the world economy has been subject to large and unsyncronized changes in fiscal policies, high and volatile real rates of tnterest, large fluctuations in real exchange rates, and significant variations in private-sector spending. This paper reviews some of the key facts...

This paper deals with the international transmission of the effects of budget deficits on world rates of interest and spending. The model assumes a two-country world within which capital markets are integrated, individuals behave rationally, and the behavior of individuals and governments are...

This paper deals with the relations among international liquidity,the exchange-rate regime and the effectiveness of monetary policy. The first part of the paper contains an empirical study of the demand for international reserves. It is shown that (i) reserve holdings are a stable function of a...

Although there have been a large number of empirical studies of the demand for international reserves, there have not been many successful demonstrations that deviations of the actual stock of reserves from the target level defined by the demand function trigger a process of adjustment. This...

We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the...

Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under...