Agent-based methodology is adopted to analyze the relationship between governance structure and the evolution of product portfolio. A corporation and a cooperative are distinguished by the single origin constraint. The single origin constraint entails that the product requiring the inputs of the...

Fruit and vegetable marketing organization The Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing...

This article addresses the influence costs problem in the governance structure ‘agribusiness cooperative.’ Influence costs are higher in cooperatives than in investor-oriented firms due to the unique governance structure of the former. Hypotheses are formulated and tested regarding the...

We empirically examine the determinants of the allocation of decision rights in the context of fruit and vegetable contracting. The main conclusion is that under contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms. Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms...

We determine the circumstances when the absence of public listing, often believed to be a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is established in a multi-task principal-agent model, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and their CEOs...

Bearing the legacy from central-planned system, the tax system in local China still lacks transparency and, in many cases, the liabilities of firms, especially those with extensive influences, are subject to negotiation despite the new tax-reform 1994. Applying Hirschman’s Exit-Voice theory,...

The aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of...

In the 1950s and 1960s there was a debate about the nature of an agricultural cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farm, the cooperative as vertical integration or the cooperative as a firm. We revisit this debate with various concepts from the theory of the firm that have been...

For the purpose of explaining governance structure variety in franchising, we explore the impact of governance structure on the incentives to invest in specific assets for the franchisor as well as the distributors. Wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, and mixed (dual distribution) franchise systems...