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Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence

Dreher, Axel; Gehring, Kai; Kotsogiannis, Christos; … - Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e … - 2013

This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010692435

Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs

Dreher, Axel; Marchesi, Silvia - Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e … - 2013

example of a "delegation-scheme". Conversely, project aid represents a more "centralized" type of aid. According to the theory … of policies should be increased (delegation). Conversely, there should be less freedom in designing policies when donors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010901428

Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers' Hierarchy

Cella, Michela - Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e … - 2009

In this paper we study the delegation of a production process in a three-tier hierarchy. The principal contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517852

Agency and communication problems in IMF conditional lending

Cerniglia, Floriana; Sabani, Laura - Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e … - 2008

agency bias we expect delegation (ownership) to be the optimal incentive scheme. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005432586

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e … - 2009

agency bias we expect delegation (ownership) to be the optimal incentive scheme. Controlling for economic and political …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256353