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Freedom, Time Constraints and Progressive Taxation

Screpanti, Ernesto - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2004

In this paper I present a measure of freedom for opportunity sets which are bounded by both budget and time constraints … leaving freedom distribution unaltered should apply progressive taxation. Since incomes bind freedom only partially when time … constraints bind, taxing the rich reduces his freedom proportionally less than taxing the poor reduces his. Moreover, when incomes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572317

Network geometry and the scope of the median voter theorem

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2015

It is shown that the median voter theorem for committee-decisions holds over a full unimodal preference domain whenever (i) the underlying median interval space satisfi?es interval antiexchange and (ii) unimodality is defi?ned with respect to the incidence-geometry of the relevant outcome space...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123768

Strategy-proofness and unimodality in bounded distributive lattices

Savaglio, Ernesto; Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2012

It is shown that a social choice rule f : X<sup>N</sup> ? X as defined on a bounded distributive lattice (X, ) is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of unimodal total preorders on X if and only if it can be represented as an iterated median of projections and constants. The equivalence of individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010087

Concept Lattices and Convexity of Coalitional Game Forms

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2006

The concept lattice of a coalitional game form is introduced and advocated as a structural classificatory tool. The basic properties of such lattices are studied. Sufficient concept-latticial properties for convexity of the underlying coalitional game form are identified. Spectral issues...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766499

On Concept Lattices of Efficiently Solvable Voting Protocols

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2006

It is shown that concept lattices can be attached in a natural way to any voting protocol. The concept lattices of some voting protocols that are solvable with respect to some prominnent solution concepts and outcome-efficient are studied: it is proved that they typically amount to chains

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766500

Virtuous Circles and Contested Identities: on Collective Identification Procedures with Independent Qualified Certification

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2007

This paper studies Collective Identification Procedures in a finite lattice when the standard Independence axiom is dropped and replaced with an Independent Qualified Certification requirement

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766507

A Characterization of Height-Based Extensions of Principal Filtral Opportunity Rankings

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2003

A parameterized characterization of height-based total extensions of Principal filtral opportunity rankings is provided and shown to include as a special case a version of the well-known Pattanaik-Xu characterization of the cardinality-based ranking.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824331

The Libertarian Identification Rule in Finite Atomistic Lattices

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2008

Collective Identification Procedures (CIPs) model admission rules regulating membership in associations, communities and clubs: the Libertarian identification rule Fl is the CIP which essentially relies on self-certification. This paper studies Fl in an arbitrary finite atomistic lattice,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824332

The Proportional Lottery Protocol is Strongly Participatory and VNM-Strategy-Proof

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2006

A voting protocol is said to be strongly participatory if for any player i and any strategy profile either the outcome is i‘s preferred one or has a strategy which would ensure her a better outcome, and VNMstrategy proof if at any preference profile the set of sincere strategies of each player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704498

A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires

Vannucci, Stefano - Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, … - 2004

In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704522