Prior to the global financial crisis which began in 2007, corporate governance reforms of the preceding thirty years had promoted a shareholder-value based model of management for which there was little historical precedent. The underlying legal model of the firm retained a vestigial sense of...

This paper investigates the relatively unexplored relationship between dividends and ownership structure in an emerging market setting. Using a unique panel dataset of foreign ownership and firm attributes of listed Korean firms, we first characterize foreign ownership after the full capital...

We investigate the relation between long run takeover performance and board share ownership in the acquiring company for a sample of 142 UK takeovers completed between 1985-95. We find evidence of a non-linear relationship both between board ownership and takeover profitability, and between...

In this study we provide evidence of cross-sectional dependence of bidder-shareholder wealth and target’s board characteristics. More specifically we provide evidence that the percentage of non-executives, the board size, the stock holdings of executives, and the other directorships held by...

Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder...

Law and economics scholarship has contributed greatly to our understanding of corporate insolvency law. This paper provides an overview of this literature. It begins by defining some relevant terminology, and then reviews theories about the goals of insolvency law. It then considers Jackson's...

Legal origins theory suggests that law reform, strengthening shareholder and creditor rights, should enhance financial development. We use recently created datasets measuring legal change over time in a sample of 25 developing, developed and transition countries to test this claim. We find that...

It is argued here that - contrary to current conventional wisdom - an active market for corporate control is not an essential ingredient of either company law reform or financial and economic development. The absence of such a market in coordinated market systems during their modern economic...

We consider the consequences of the regular private meetings between directors of FTSE 100 companies and their major institutional shareholders. Whilst the economic incentives for both the flow of information and the formation of 'strategic informational relationships' between the two have been...

We examine the impact of acquisitions on executive pay in UK acquirers over 1984-2001. For the overall sample, which includes foreign, domestic, public and private targets, there is a significant transitory pay increase. Pay changes are not affected by target nationality or organizational form,...