This paper gives an overview of the causes of the European debt crisis and the consequences for the external relations. It finds that political mishandling has increased uncertainty, which has contributed to a tendency for the euro to become weaker.

This paper gives an overview of the causes of the European debt crisis and the consequences for the external relations. It finds that political mishandling has increased uncertainty, which has contributed to a tendency for the euro to become weaker.

This paper gives an overview of the causes of the European debt crisis and the consequences for the external relations. It finds that political mishandling has increased uncertainty, which has contributed to a tendency for the euro to become weaker.

This paper examines the optimality of intertemporal price discrimination when network externality effects are present in the consumption of a durable good. We conduct our study in two settings. In a model with two household types, utilities are dependent on the cumulative proportion of...

This paper examines the viability or appropriateness of two polar solutions, especially free-floating regime for developing countries. To do so, we investigate the Korean financial markets, which provide interesting case, utilizing multivariate GARCH and various VSR (Vector Auto-Regression)...

We develop a model of asset trading with financial leverage in an economy with a continuum of investors. The investors are assumed to have diverse and rational beliefs in the sense of being compatible with observed data. We show that an increase in leverage ratio may cause the stock price to...

We consider estimation and inference of parameters in discrete games allowing for multiple equilibria, without using an equilibrium selection rule. We do a set inference while a game model can contain infinite dimensional parameters. Examples can include signaling games with discrete types where...

In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agents information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of...

We consider a (deterministic) evolutionary model where players have dynamic expectations about the strategy distribution. We provide a global analysis of the co-evolution of play and expectations for a generic two{by{two game. Besides the the typical indeterminacy of the evolutionary dynamics,...

This paper studies an econometric modeling of a signaling game with two players where one player has one of two types. In particular, we develop an estimation strategy that identies the payos structure and the distribution of types from data of observed actions. We can achieve uniqueness of...