We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects : A horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more...

This paper analyzes the political economy of delayed agreement over fiscal reforms, in a setting where two interest groups can bargain over the allocation of the cost of the stabilization. This contrasts with the classic contribution of Alesina and Drazen, who assume that a group which concedes...

Does voter turnout affect policy outcomes? This long-standing question has been re-visited recently with close empirical scrutiny. These studies, however, commonly suffer from a problem of omitting variables correlated with both causal and outcome variables : specifically, immeasurable political...

This paper experimentally examines the multilateral bargaining games to derive some policy implications for real trade negotiations. It shows the following findings : there are significant delays in games including veto players in some circumstances, but no delays in games including...

This paper considers how electoral competition affects voters turnout and candidate choice. We do so via an instrumental-variable (IV) bivariate probit with selection which jointly estimates both processes. Our analysis controls for individual and election characteristics, campaigning, and...

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question : what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f : Dn - A satisfying unanimity, has the...

We present a spatial map of the Italian House of Deputies during the XIII Legislature obtained by applying the Poole and Rosenthal methodology to roll call data. We estimate coordinates for almost all the 650 Deputies that were on the Houses floor at the time, and we aggregate them according to...

This paper discusses what political and economic factors affect house representatives voting behavior on free trade agreement (FTA) implementation bills in the 108th and 109th Congresses in the U.S. using a simultaneous probit-tobit model that consists of contribution equations and voting...

The paper examines the division of tasks required between politicians and bureaucrats to run an effective rural employment guarantee scheme (EGS) in India, in the context of Indian history and habits. There are still weaknesses in the incentive structure of the new nationwide EGS. First, there...