We consider a signalling game in which a population of receivers decide on the outcome by majority rule, sender and receivers have conflicting interests, and there is uncertainty about both players types. We model players rationality along the lines of recent findings in behavioral game theory....

This paper considers how electoral competition affects voters turnout and candidate choice. We do so via an instrumental-variable (IV) bivariate probit with selection which jointly estimates both processes. Our analysis controls for individual and election characteristics, campaigning, and...

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question : what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f : Dn - A satisfying unanimity, has the...

Based on the premise that a functioning state is a necessary pre-requisite for pro-poor change, it is critical to investigate the role of the bureaucracy as a key catalyst in this process. Weber (1968) ascribes bureaucracies to be anchors of the modern nation state as their conduct is based on...

The selection of optimum number of indicators is the key to any Sustainable Development Indicator (SDI) research. Indicators, too less in number may be inadequate to convey the message and; too many may dilute the purpose. To arrive at a limited number of indicators from a larger set of potential...

With an equal social structure, China seems to be better prepared for a functioning democracy than other developing countries. It has stayed authoritarian because the CCP has successfully diverted the demand for democratization through tactics of economic growth, expansion of civil liberty, and...

Influencing and being influenced by others is the very essence of human behaviour. We put forward an exploratory asset-pricing model allowing for social influence on investor judgments under ambiguity. The time series of returns generated by our model displays volatility clustering, a puzzling...

We discuss whether or not the introduction of climate change considerations into Nash tariff games increases or reduces post retaliation tariffs. We briefly discuss how climate change considerations can be introduced into computational trade models. We then calculate optimal tariffs in...

We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer given a framework of bilateral moral hazard with variable but non-verifiable input quality. Given the inability of third parties to verify input quality, each party has an incentive to cheat the...