Our paper examines the origins, growth, and the development of accounting practices and disclosures in Pakistan and the factors that influenced them. We traced the early days of accounting in the Indian subcontinent and the British colonial influence over the accounting of newly independent...

In this paper we explore the role of the static, selection and dynamic corporate governance changes on performance of commercial banks. We use stochastic cost frontier and panel data methods for an unbalanced panel data of Pakistani banks from 1991 to 2005. We find overall bank cost inefficiency...

This paper advances the argument that institutional investors, particularly mutual funds can play a vital role in enhancing corporate governance in emerging economies. Accordingly, regulatory framework need to be structured in a manner that would encourage the growth of the mutual fund industry...

The relation between multiple directorships, busy directors and firm performance has been researched predominantly in the context of developed economies, notably the US. This paper extends the existing literature on multiple directorships in two ways; first, by providing additional evidence on...

It is widely believed that corporate boards are overly reluctant to fire their CEOs. The conventional explanation for retaining a CEO regardless of his/her talent is that a CEO chooses the board members and has the power to fire them. However, very few studies have investigated how a new CEO is...

India has an elaborate system of capital controls which impede cap- ital mobility and particularly short-term debt. Yet, when the global money market fell into turmoil after the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth- ers on 13/14 September 2008, the Indian money market immediately experienced considerable...

This paper analyses two pronounced features of Japanese corporate governance : large corporate boards almost entirely composed of insiders and the tendency to appoint CEOs through internal promotions. It is often argued that Japanese boards are less effective in monitoring CEOs than U.S. boards...